20 May 2007

"Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global Economy" by World Bank

This is a report by the World bank (and a think tank) to study the impact of the growth of China and India on other countries in the World.

Provides a good insight into the China and India story:

(a) Sorry, China and India are not Giants. Though they house 38% of world population they account for 6.4% of World GDP (yes, purchasing power parity is not useful in evaluating your impact on other countries since size of trade and exchange rates are more important than price levels).

(b) Sorry, this will not change even after sustained growth in the next decade. India would grow from being 1.7% of World economy to 2.4% in 2020 (okay, 3.2% if you are optimistic). China would grow from 4.7% now to 7.9%.

(c) Sorry, India is not a dominant player in providing services to the world. India’s export of services is just 1.8% of global trade in services.

(d) Sorry, IT just accounts for 6% of India’s service revenue. Nope, it is a myth to believe growth in IT sector would transform Indian economy. It did not. It may not.

(e) Nope, energy economists don’t need to worry. India accounts for just 3.4% of global oil usage. In the next ten years any hike in oil price is more likely to come from supply side hitches than from increased demand for oil in India or China.

(f) Nope, US current account deficit is not due to China’s import barriers or an undervalued currency. US is just not saving enough.

(g) Nope, China and India are not competing head on for their products. The top 25 exports of China and India have only one product in common! (Yes sire, refined petroleum).

(h) Nope, Dhirubhai Ambani alone is not enough to reform our textiles industry. Our textile exports is $ 10 billion a year. Wal Mart alone buys $ 18 billion textiles from China. Did you know one major impediment is the delivery time from India to US? Yes, 24 days!

(In passing, the economists say that the movie industry in India is not known to produce world class movies; though one did come recently: “Bend it like Beckham”! Apologies Mani Ratnam, economists do not know as much about movies as about GDP!)

Have we handled our economy well? We made some mistakes in the way we managed our economy.

(a) We started with one major disadvantage. Inequality.

(b) Economic growth is rarely balanced. It often results in enhancing inequality.

(c) There are good inequalities (differences in income and wealth because some earned more than others) and bad inequalities (lack of access to education or credit to pursue an economic activity). Good inequalities are necessary to maintain incentive for growth. Bad inequalities prevent people from escaping poverty.

(d) We got our philosophies mixed up. Instead of attempting to eliminate bad inequalities by providing access to opportunities for the poor, we went after good inequalities by suppressing incentive for economic growth.

(e) We restrained firms from freely pursuing economic activity (by reserving several activities for the State or for small enterprises and by introducing a license raj that required government permission to start or expand a business).

(f) We prevented efficient allocation of resources (by protective trade policy that perpetuated advantage to existing players, by a directional tax policy, by state control of all funding and by restrictive labor laws).

(g) On the other hand, we did not provide access to education or market driven micro finance delivery to the poor to acquire human capital to escape poverty.

(h) End result: We did not grow enough; but the inequality went up. The poor did not benefit from economic growth at all.

(i) Since our political system depended on popular support, political administrations “blamed” a variety of targets (businessmen, upper caste, land holders, foreign hands) for the failure to eradicate poverty and used the resultant “popular anger” to consolidate their power base.

(j) Thank God we had a crisis in 1991. Debt service rose to 21% of receipts. Interest burden rose to 20% of expenditure. We ran out of spendable currency. No one was willing to lend.

(k) Prime Minister Narasimha Rao went beyond curing the immediate disease. Rao government cut back industries reserved for State; removed licensing requirements; devalued rupee; allowed current account convertibility; removed quotas and reduced tariffs; and lifted restrictions on foreign investment.

(l) Fortunately the reform process, despite vigorous debate, has developed sufficient consensus to stay on track in succeeding administrations.

(m) We have some more miles to go:
(1) We need to provide access to education and credit to facilitate people escape poverty. Spending money on rural infrastructure alone will not kill “bad inequality”. If this is not done, India would continue to be a miracle of “jobless growth” and political consensus for reform would evaporate diluting growth prospects. Equality is not just a nice thing to do; it is essential for going after growth.
(2) We need to get “government” out of “business” even more. Subsidies will have to reduce. Buredensome state enterprises cannot be funded by public expenditure. Bad loans in banks will have to reduce. Regulatory rigidity in labor market will have to reduce.
(3) We need to step up “governance”. We need to step up government effectiveness and bureaucracy quality.
(4) We need to manage our “balance sheet” well. We cannot be an economy whose liabilities are in “high cost equity” (FDI and portfolio investments) and whose assets are in “low yield reserves”. This asymmetry is expensive.

China has one advantage over us. An early start. China has built a strong manufacturing base with an eye on the global market (40% of its GDP is from exports vs 15% for us). However, in the end, China has one disadvantage. In China the State is determining who will pursue economic activity and who will not by its “hukou” system (license to live in special zones) and “TVE system” (town and village enterprise owned by local governments with limited authority to retain and reinvest super profits). This was useful in creating "private firms" in a socialist economy.However, this past success is going to be a burden for China in the future. A very large population, distinguished by party discretion, got left out in the growth process and resentment is bound to build up. Building political consensus to the reform process is going to be quite a challenge in China. This may hamper growth. To this extent China is in a "trapped transition".

India has a higher chance of sustaining and growing political consensus for reforms because it has the political institutional framework to let differing voices debate vigorously before building consensus. The pace is bound to be slow but the traction is firm.

It is nice to think that Leftist leaders Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury, with their wisdom and ability to disagree, play an important role in this long term competitive advantage for India over China!

13 May 2007

"Planet Earth" by BBC/Discovery Channel

This DVD issue is awesome.

Discovery Channel/BBC team use state of the art technology to take us through the various eco systems of our planet - polar ice caps, mountains, plains, rivers, caves and deserts. You get to see the regions from the space, from the sky, from a tree top, on land and on occasions from down under. Rare events (births, first moments, hunts, survivals) have been captured with great alacrity and patience and presented in one seamless flow.

Ever seen Niagara falls from various observation points? Right atop the horse shoe falls? On a "maid of the mist" boat tour taking you as close to the falls as possible? On the temporary wooden platform of "hurricane deck" where the secondary spray itself is powerful to knock you off and the huge mass of flowing water above your head "scares" you? On a "journey behind the falls" (on the Canadian side)?

Ever seen the Grand Canyon at sunset time from "Hopi point" with the Colorado appearing as a nice serene silver ribbon barely visible in the total landscape? Ever trekked down "Hermit's rest" to realize how rugged the terrain is? Ever took a "white water rapids" ride to experience the thunderous flow that the silver ribbon has become? Ever took a helicopter ride over the canyon to see Peak Brahma and Peak Vishnu in their inspiring splendour lording over the rocks?

Ever snorkelled in the Great barrier reefs in Australia? Ever did an underwater glass boat ride over the Arlington reefs (and get teased for it because your kids got to do the more adventurous 50 m scuba dive around the same time)?

Ever spent a day to reach Jungfraujoch (through the Eiger tunnel up the Eigher North wall) to see the picturesque view atop the mammoth Sphinx observatory deck? Ever saw the same stuff from a flight tour over the Swiss alps and realize that this huge observatory is a tiny toy in a massive blanket of snow?

Ever stood on an Alpine farm land with a parasail (and a tandem pilot, of course) attached to you and run at breakneck speed toward the edge of a cliff? Ever experienced the magic moment when your feet are off the ground and you are flying/floating/sailing/gliding with nothing between your feet and the lake town 2,000 m below? Ever moved from the embarrassing moment when you have self doubts (while your little girls and wife have taken off smoothly) to the moment when you are in air catching a thermal and getting a big uplift?

Every time you have an awesome moment like this in your life your respect for Planet Earth goes up. So does your fun in living in this ecosystem.

This exceptionally entertaining DVD series brings those magic moments of joy you experienced (and those you have not) right into your living room.

Grab one. Watch in a big screen TV. Enjoy.

"Benazir Bhutto, daugher of the east" by Benazir Bhutto

In his book “Prisoner without a name and cell without a number” Jacobo Timerman says that oppressed population go through three stages during the course of oppression: anger, fear and apathy. For "anger and fear" Pakistan did not have to look beyond General Zia-ul-Haq. For apathy they did not have to look beyond Benazir Bhutto.

Benazir, in 1988, was Mannah coming down from heaven for Pakistan.

She was the first born of the elite aristocratic Bhutto family. (Charles Napier, famous for his “Peccavi – I have Sinned” pun writes that Bhutto landholding was so extensive that he would travel for hours in Sind and yet be in Bhutto land). She went to Radcliffe and later to Oxford. She was the first woman president of the Oxford Union.

Young Benazir, 23 when her father was murdered by Zia, was kept in prison by Zia for several years. Undaunted by all this, she provided leadership to PPP, her political party. When allowed to go out of Pakistan in 1984 she continued to run the party from her Barbican apartment in London.

In 1986 she decided to return courageously to Pakistan when Zia was ruling. People defied military rulers and gave her a welcome that remains unrivalled. She continued to whip up her agenda for bringing democracy back to Pakistan for the next two years.

1988 proved to be a turning point for Pakistan and Bhutto. Zia’s role for Pakistan to be a frontline state in the war against communism proved to be temporary. Zia’s role for Pakistan to be a frontline state in evangelizing Wahabi Islam proved to be permanent. Zia died in an air accident. Benazir Bhutto became the first woman PM of Pakistan when she was just 35 yrs.

Until this time her life is a story that inspires. After becoming PM hers is a story of lost opportunities.

She did not use her power base to enshrine democracy and was comfortable securing a position of power in existing autocratic frameworks. This allowed Ghulam Ishaq Khan (a civil servant who succeeded to become President) to dismiss her once and Farooq Laghari (an underling who got elected to be President due to Benazir’s support) to dismiss her again.

She did not ensure her husband was above suspicion. Pakistan government had detained her husband in prison for more than 6 years on 90 charges of corruption though it has not secured conviction in even one case . However, it is not easy to ignore the fact that Zardari, not rich at the time of marriage to Benazir, owns a 355 acre property south of London according to Wikipedia.

Benazir is a good writer though. Some interesting snippets:

The feelings of an educated young Muslim girl wearing a barkah for the first time are vividly described. The world was not the same through gauze. The build up of humidity inside the cloak was uncomfortable. Her relief when her father tells that she does not need to wear a barkah is immense. However, it was her father’s decision; not hers. Who is the liberal?

Benazir Bhutto rightly feels that the West does not care for freedom in frontier states as much as freedom at home:

(a) In 1958 US trained Pakistan Army in “immobilizing” a government through strikes. The operation was titled “Operation Wheeljam”. Why would US want to do that? Why would Pakistan army want to get trained in that?

(b) Margaret Thatcher, in a trip to Pakistan, praised Zia and declared Pakistan to be the “last bastion of freedom”. An example where a leader's wisdom has not kept pace with knowledge.

(c) Undersecretary of State James Buckley testified before US Congress that “elections were not in the best interest of the security of Pakistan”. Another example of paucity of wisdom.

Pakistan had a long term price to pay. After the Afghan war, Kalashnikovs were available, according to Benazir, for $ 40 in Karachi. One can rent by the hour too. Landowners and Industrialists began to employ private armies to protect themselves. By 1983, Pakistan had become the major supplier of heroin to the World with some support from the State. (Abdullah Bhatti, one of the two drug bosses, was arrested and sentenced by a military court. But Zia intervened and gave him a Presidential pardon, a power he never used for anyone else!). Narco terrorism was born.

The second major impact was on women. Zia introduced the Hudood ordinances whereby a woman charging a rape should prove it with four male witnesses; otherwise she would face adultery charges herself. Safia Bibi, a blind servant girl was raped by her employer and his son; and could not prove it – rape rarely being conducted in public. The two men went free and Safia was charged with adultery. Campaigns by outraged women saved Safia Bibi; but not other less fortunate women.

However, Benazir is not as eloquent about her times as PM as about her times as a prisoner. There is very little about her challenges as a PM: her failure to get a good constitution written, her failure in dealing with Presidents who never had public mandate, her failure in dealing with traditional power brokers in the army, in the ISI, her failure to rein in her husband; her initiatives for development of social and economic aspects of Pakistan and her failure in engaging with India. In the end, she got consumed by the very forces she tolerated as a prisoner and as a PM. Pakistan did not revolt when she moved out to Dubai.

The book is interesting when it deals with the anger and fear till 1988; and gets boring when it reaches the stage of Jacob Timerman’s “apathy” after 1988. Benazir too does not think the period is important and devotes 90% of the book for her first 35 years till she becomes PM and just 10% for the next 19 years as PM, Opposition leader and Leader-in-exile.

When it was first published in 1988, I liked the book. Today, am just bored.

06 April 2007

"Kundun" by Martin Scorsese

In 1985 I was hosted by Dr Tom Bailey and Dr Judy Bailey in Rochester Hills, Michigan in a student exchange program. Judy is a lawyer (truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth) and Tom is a dentist (tooth, the whole tooth and nothing but the tooth).

World was divided then between two super powers. Ronald Reagan was talking of "evil empire" and "star wars". Mikhail Gorbachev was tinkering with "peretroiska" and "glasnost".

Judy had just then returned from a tour of the Soviet Union and was presenting her photographs at the local church on a Sunday evening.

One photograph would stay in my mind forever. It showed a very small group of people congregating to pray; and a nice small Cross in a well decorated alcove. Sixty eight years of an atheistic political rule could not destroy religious faith and emotions.

The ability of human faith to stay alive across generations when such a faith is denied a chance to exist is amazing! Someone somewhere always keeps tiny little sparks alive for causes forced to be forgotten.

Therefore, Tibet has hope.

No matter how many years China rules Tibet; no matter how many Chinese settle down in Tibet and convert Tibet into a Chinese territory, someone somewhere would keep tiny little sparks alive to keep Tibet's identity as a peaceful serene temporal/religious system.

Kundun is the story of Dalai Lama.

The young boy is discovered to be the reincarnation of the earlier deceased Dalai Lama; is taken to Lhasa and coached in the ways of Buddhism. How does the peaceful wise leader of a non violent nation fight the aggressive plans of an ambitious, efficient and modernized army of Red China? Is the nation important? Or is "ahimsa" important? It is exceptionally difficult for a young Dalai Lama to decide.

In the end, Red China occupies Tibet and Dalai Lama is forced to move to friendly India and form a government in exile. He is yet to return to Tibet.

Tibet is forgotten by World because the aggressor does not play by its rules and the offended would not resort to terrorism.

However, nations never cease to exist. Someone somewhere keeps a tiny spark alive. Martin Scorsese's 1997 movie: Kundun is one more spark for Tibet's continued existence.

The movie stays away from melodrama. China is not portrayed as a villain. The way some Chinese narrate how Chairman Mao brought justice to their life is likely to win respect for communism. The young Lama is portrayed in life like terms: a vivid mixture of curiosity, anxiety and mischief. The maturity of the young adult Dalai Lama is nicely portrayed when he tells his mother that women cannot stay in the monastery after dark in a stern affectionate tone.

Lovely movie.

27 March 2007

"Frontline Pakistan: the struggle with militant Islam" by Zahid Hussain

Zahid Hussain touches on an important topic: Pakistan’s ongoing and impending war with its own self and the tough choices ahead of President Musharraf.

The support from Public Opinion in Pakistan for terrorism as a tool to further beloved causes is worrying. The ease with which sundry pet agendas could be converted into beloved causes is twice worrying.

In order to contain global terrorism emanating from Pakistan or having a safe haven in Pakistan two things need to be done:

(a) Public opinion will have to undergo a change in Pakistan. Public opinion is useful only when it derives from the "wisdom of the crowd". This benefit would not arise unless opposing thoughts and beliefs can “co-exist peacefully”. Good leaders “discredit” public opinion if it denies room for such peaceful co-existence. Mahtma Gandhi did. Bad leaders, on the other hand, whip up public opinioin to radically extreme positions using intolerance. Adolf Hitler did. Military rulers in Pakistan are guilty of whipping up public opinion to take a self righteous radical form that destroys opposing thoughts, reasons and emotions.

(b) Defending one’s religion is one’s right. Giving one’s life for one’s religion, one’s country or one’s society is a noble deed. This is true for Americans dying for the Flag and Muslims dying for their holy causes. However, immature leadership is quick to provide its pet agenda a higher purpose to merit the label of a "noble cause". In Pakistan this seems to be too easy. Military, whether in rule or not, has used religious leadership to provide the “emotional ammunition” to enlist support for every thing including a proxy fight against Soviet Union on behalf of USA, a proxy fight against the perceived foreign policy of USA, a proxy fight against one faction of freedom fighters in Afghanistan in favour of another, a proxy fight on behalf of Pakistan’s army itself in various engagements in/with India.

As a result, the postal address for global terrorism is somewhere within Pakistan.

President Musharraf is now forced to:
(a) appear to the outside World to be firm in dealing with relgion based terrorism and
(b) appear to Pakistanis to not succumb to international pressure

Quite a funambulation even for the skillful Musharraf. Musharraf does appear sincere in attempting to weed out terrorism; but does not appear sincere in having a go at modifying public opinion in Pakistan. His challenges in doing so cannot be underestimated.

Zahid Hussain is the Pakistani correspondent of The Times, The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek. His dispassionate insightful analysis of Pakistan’s struggle with militant Islam is excellent. As with most books about Pakistan, there is excellent analysis of the present but no thought from anyone in Pakistan on how to solve the problem. The absence of an alternative thought or the unwillingness of such thought to express itself is hardly Zahid Hussain’s fault.

05 January 2007

"Scoop!" by Kuldip Nayar

It was a wrong time to be a teenager.

Socialism, seeded in by lofty intellectuals in pursuit of an utopian dream of equality, was failing to deliver. Yet this failed economic solution was a good political platform to secure a constituency.

Political standards were at their lowest. A son became more important than a country. Democratic traditions were killed. Fundamental rights were suspended and held inferior to State policy. State policy was of course as decided by a small coterie. Opponents were imprisoned. Newspapers were censored. There were a few who were elated because trains ran in time and because there were no strikes. The worst moment was when a sycophant Deb Kant Barua proclaimed: “India is Indira and Indira is India”. The leader was hopeless. The country was without hope.

And then, people spoke. Indira's actions and her coterie were firmly rejected. (She herself was not rejected; she was later able to come back to power).

In that first whiff of freedom, it was fun to rediscover hope in life.

There was an eagerness to understand what went wrong; how did it go wrong and what made everything right. Kuldip Nayar provided the answers in his book “Judgment”.

Kuldip Nayar never disappoints. The young lawyer from Lahore who migrated to India, studied his Masters in Journalism in Northwestern University in Evanston Illinois, returned to be press secretary for G B Pant and later Lal Bahadur Shastri and went on to be editor of Statesman is a well balanced analyst of political events just as they happen.

In “Scoop!” he provides an “inside angle” to events in the subcontinent. Some are thought provoking. Some are a revelation. Some are of no interest beyond the heat of the moment.

Some snippets:

(a) Mountbatten concedes his inept handling of partition caused the death of a million people. However, he claims his net score with his Maker is positive because he saved two and a half million lives in World War II. To imagine this "convoluted thinker" was making policies in ruling a nation is scary!

(b) Radcliffe says that Lahore (with a majority of Hindus/Sikhs at the time of partition) should have come to India and was given to Pakistan because the new nation did not have a big city. Do we hold a plebiscite in Lahore now?

(c) Morarji lost a chance to succeed Nehru because a press interview made him sound ambitious because it reported that “he threw his hat into the ring” and tilted the votes against him in favour of Shastri.

(d) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto concedes that “he started the war with India in 1965” by orchestrating the infiltration!

(e) When Congressman Sardul Singh Kaeshwar wondered whether he should repay a Rs 500 loan that was time barred, Mahatma Gandhi was firm in saying this was not a legal issue and this was a moral issue. Nehru dumped Keshav Dev Malavia because Malavia could not account a political contribution he received for Congress party from a businessman. Moral standards in politics were high. Modern day politicians demand proof of corruption charges in a court of law. That an average adult would have reasons to deduce there was corruption is not sufficient.

(f) Indira Gandhi suspended fundamental rights. Gandhi and Nehru would not have approved. Yet four people did! Justices Ray, Beg, Bhagwati and Chandrachud agreed that suspension of fundamental rights did not imply suspension of rule of law. Ray opined that when there is “public danger” protective law should give way to interests of the state. There was hope however. Justice Khanna dissented. (Khanna was superceded when a junior Beg was appointed Chief Justice. Khanna did not oblige the government by resigning. He stood tall by staying). In my mind, Justice Khanna is a hero.

A good read.

03 December 2006

"India's foreign policy 1947-2003" by J N Dixit

We don’t have in India “transparent” debates on public policy by “vested interests” (with opposing views) as they happen in more evolved democracies like the US. Our politicians are yet to appreciate that public policy should contribute to and draw from public opinion. There is very little information available in public forum on the thought processes that lead to evolution and management of public policy. Foreign policy is no exception.

J N Dixit, an erstwhile Foreign Secretary (and later political advisor) with several decades of experience in civil service provides a rare opportunity to get an insight into the evolution of India's foreign policy in this book. The reader is rewarded with informed anlaysis from someone with erudition and a ringside view.

Dixit’s book is enjoyably high on anlaysis and enjoyably low on episodes and anecdotes.

In a democracy any public policy is formed by a judicious mixture of brain (the right move), heart (the right feeling and the right principle) and lips (the right thing to say). Foreign policy, again, is no exception.

The infant India, initially tended to prefer the heart and the lips. Principles were considered more important than interests. We tended to pontificate and made a few mistakes:

(1) In 1947, it was India, not Pakistan, that took Kashmir to the UN in the expectation that the UN would uphold India’s claims on merits. Lt General Kulwant Singh pleaded with Nehru to give him “just a few more days” to free the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistani presence. Nehru did not listen. US and Britain used procedural gimmicks to transform invasion by one member state against territories of another state as a territorial dispute between two member states. India ended up converting Kashmir as a dispute while Tibet, Falklands and Grenada were not.

(2) In the 1950s India promoted “non alignment” as a guiding principle. In truth, India did not practice this principle. India was quick to criticize invasion of Suez Canal but hesitant to criticize invasion of Hungary. India’s credibility was challenged. Indira Gandhi modified this approach by aligning with Soviet Union to protect India’s defense interests cutting across ideology differences.

(3) In the 1950s India missed an opportunity to get the border resolved with China as a quid pro quo for recognizing Tibet as a province of China. Several mistakes were made: Chinese annexation of Tibet was recognized without a quid pro quo; the protests against border intrusions were not firm enough; the military action was silly and adventurous; choosing to open all fronts with China was a tactical error; not using the air force was a tactical error. The military defeat by China was total. It was US intervention that saved India.

(4) In mid 1950s US wanted India to replace China as a permanent member of the Security Council. India declined this offer in view of its friendship with China.

(5) In 1963 US advised India to develop nuclear weapons (as a strategic counter to Soviet and Chinese designs). India declined the offer on grounds of principle.

This tendency to project principles ahead of strategic interests did affect India. However, as the country’s leadership gained a mature understanding of why societies work together or against each other, the precedence to interests prevailed.

Thankfully several of our foreign policy decisions were guided by realpolitik interests and not by “lofty principles” and “moral high ground”:

(1) India got the princely states, especially Hyderabad, to accede to India to form a wholesome territorial entity instead of letting India look like an unfinished jigsaw puzzle of a five year old (only the British could think of such a solution!).

(2) India annexed Goa (after wasting 13 years in negotiating with Portugal’s Salazar) and Sikkim.

(3) India won the support of Kashmir’s ruler Hari Singh and its popular leader Sheikh Abdullah to support accession of Kashmir to India

(4) India’s escalated its response to the 1965 attack by Pakistan by opening all fronts and reaching Sialkot and Lahore unmindful of international opinion against disproportionate response.

(5) India engaged with Pakistan to liberate the eastern wing of Pakistan, unmindful of discouragement from the US, when 9 million refugees poured into India when Pakistan’s army unleashed a reign of terror on its own citizens.

(6) India aligned with the Soviet Union to protect its interests in an “unrepresentative” UN and to protect its defence interests cutting across ideological differences.

(7) India firmly refused to sign multi-national treaties (on nuclear weapons, fissile materials and missile technology) that attempted to prevent proliferation while enshrining a state of permanent competitive advantage for the “early birds”

(8) India exploded nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998, unmindful of international opinion, to firmly establish India as a nuclear weapons state to prevent a few “early birds”, using loftier principles, attempting to enshrine their advantages on a permanent basis.

(9) India dealt with Pakistan in Kargil, unmindful of its nuclear weapons potential, to again send a message that the territorial integrity of India cannot be compromised.

Dixit is substantially pleased with the way Indian foreign policy has been managed.

In a democracy where political leadership changes quite frequently, it is only to be expected that there would be some faux pas. There are a few contenders for the “ugly” moments: Gujral’s embrace with Saddam Hussain in 1989, George Fernandez’s proclamation that India’s nuclear testing was driven by potential threats from China in 1998, Rajesh Pilot and General Krishna Rao pursuing self defined paths instead of working with a larger team while handling Kashmir in 1990s are a few.

In the end the foreign policy establishment seems to have understood one essential tactic. Every country acts in its own interest. Ensuring a friendship with India is in the strategic interest of those who matter is the best way to manage international relationships.

If that can be done without compromising with principles that would be lovely.

28 November 2006

"Pakistan: Eye of the storm" by Owen Bennett Jones

Owen Bennet Jones was BBC’s correspondent in Pakistan for three years till 2001.

His book is a wonderful way to understand Pakistan. It is not a typical chronological list of facts. It is a set of nicely grouped perspectives on the issues in Pakistan’s politics: the power players – army, politicians, feudal lords; the public opinion issues – Kashmir, Bomb, Bangladesh, Muhajirs; and their impact on Pakistan so far.

The reader can pick any chapter and start with it.

It is difficult to write a book about Pakistan (or India) without leaving in the reader’s mind a sense of disappointment at a biased perspective. Was partition the right thing to do? Different views may emerge based on who you ask.

It is even more difficult for a British author to keep a balanced perspective on the history of the sub-continent given the influence in his own ambience. Is Winston Churchill a wise statesman or an arrogant imperialist? Different views may emerge based on where you ask.

The author seems to have struck a fine balance between multiple views.

However, in a few instances, the author disappoints:

Pakistan does feel insecure about India’s intentions. The religious divide is a thin argument since India has more Muslims than Pakistan; and they are not raring to quit India. The divide stems from a public opinion that got shaped by the shameful violence during partition; that got nurtured after the partition by the army and politicians in Pakistan as a pet hate agenda for self serving reasons. Today, no politician or general in Pakistan can take a softer friendly stand towards India and survive in Pakistan. This is true to a lesser extent for politicians in India too. Feeding a public opinon for political convenience and in turn being fed by it is the vicious cycle that Pakistan has gotten into. The author misses this point and suggests that Pakistan’s insecurity stems from India responding to Pakistan’s invasion in 1965 by crossing the border and coming to occupy Lahore; and from India’s role in liberation of Bangaldesh. This world-view befits a public relations spin master and not a political journalist.

Pakistan’s view is that Mujahideens causing mass deaths in Kashmir are “freedom fighters” and not “terrorists”. This view suffers from several fallacies:
(a) Pakistan’s claim as homeland to the sub continent’s Muslims is not valid any more. Not after 180 million in East Pakistan walked away. Not after 200 million Muslims have stayed back in India and have played a big role in India’s growth. Pakistan has lesser Muslims, 150 million, today than either India or Bangladesh.
(b) The Mujahideen are trained and equipped by the State of Pakistan. This is low intensity proxy war. Not freedom fighting. Not terrorism.
(c) The Mujaihideen are not citizens of Kashmir. They are "outsiders" coming in for a shared religion. They sincerely believe they are fighting for the noble cause of their religion. They believe religion prevails over the State. This view raises challenges to several States. In the end this may prove to be a bigger challenge to Islamic States than other States.
The author’s sympathetic description of the events in Kashmir as “tribesmen crossing the border to fight for their muslim brethren” reflects one view reasonably well; but ignores an opposite view that may have a greater dosage of wisdom.

Pakistan’s army, in the words of Benazir Bhutto, has a better track record in fighting its own citizens than fighting other armies. The army’s response to this potential for doubt is made up of: (a) a signature tactic of proxy war – in defeat there is a cover of deniability; and in success there is glory and (b) lack of transparency on events during the war and a “spin” that could obfuscate truth. The author is willing to be a facilitator. Did Pakistan’s army lose its positions in Kargil? Or, did they walk out because Nawaz Sharif ceded to pressure from the US? The author says that Indians claim Pakistan army was dislodged in 80% of the positions before Sharif met Clinton; but “neutral” observers, relying on Pakistan sources, believe that India had dislodged Pakistan in just 12 of the 132 positions implying that the army won it and politicians lost it. Neutral observers relying on Pakistan sources? There are better neutral analyses like Arthur J Tellis’ book “Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella”.

The author parrots a view he heard in Pakistan army: that Pakistan army uses tribesmen in its engagement with India because the Indian army is more afraid of the tribesmen than Pakistan’s regular army. Steve Coll in “Ghost wars” has a different story. Officers in Pakistan army preferred to get posted to the Western front than the Eastern front where they need to meet the tough professional army from India.

Aside from these minor biases, the author has done a very good job in portraying Pakistan’s history and the issues this young nation faces.

26 November 2006

"The true face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's network of terror" by Amir Mir

Several Pakistanis have written courageously critical analysis of intolerant dictatorships and terrorism in Pakistan.

Hassan Abbas’s book “Pakistan’s drift into extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s war on terror” and Hussain Haqani’s book “Pakistan between Mosque and Military” are two good examples. So are Tariq Ali’s “Clash of Fundamemntalism” and “Jehad and Modernity”.

However, Hassan Abbas and Hussain Haqani were part of Pakistan’s politics and policy for a while and have written their books from the safe shores of United States. Tariq Ali wrote his books from the free and safe environment of England. (To be fair to Tariq, the man who inspired Rolling Stones to write their song “street fighting man”, he was critical of Pakistan even when he lived in Pakistan; but his family moved him to the UK for higher education and his years in Oxford have only rendered him a more balanced and more respected critic. Yet his best books were written when he was in the UK).

Amir Mir is different. He lives in Pakistan. He is no politician and has the reputation of being Pakistan’s leading investigative journalist. It is quite difficult for Amir Mir to be honest without fear of reprisal – by the State, by the power brokers or by the offended terrorists. It is difficult to “not belong” in Pakistan. Imagine if its Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz had to swear in public that he was instructed in his childhood by a certified orthodox Sunni cleric to avoid the dangerous allegation of being a Shiite.

Amir Mir’s courage in writing this critical analysis of Pakistan’s network of terror while living in Pakistan is a vindication of his love for his country.

Elected prime ministers as well as Military dictators are influenced by “public opinion”. One conforms to it to win popularity. Another conforms to it for “legitimacy”. Public opinion in Pakistan hovers around "religion" and "Kashmir".

The Jihad of the 1980s in Afghanistan ended up empowering the “religious right” as a major influence of public opinion in Pakistan. The religious right used zakat funds to harvest a crop of fighters willing to die for pet causes. United States was myopic to believe communism is worth thwarting using communalism. Pakistan’s ISI provided the institutional framework to assemble all this together and execute the objectives.

The current Jihad against a wider array of enemies – the United States, Israel, Afghanistan and India is an improved version with a public opinion even more supportive of religious right and intolerant of alternative view points. The State is trying to be a supporter of international opinion in containing terrorism and a supporter of Pakistan public opinion by not overdoing it. End result: an assorted list of small groups, all equipped with very powerful motivation to destroy civilization elsewhere for causes the groups firmly believe are moral and honourable.

Amir Mir provides a mosaic of news about the rise of various terrorist groups, their pet causes, operations etc.

The picture one gets makes one feel sad for Pakistan. Because terrorism has always failed in achieving its objectives and has alienated the vital support of public opinion to causes that otherwise would have been very moral and very supportable. On the other hand, terrorism has rarely failed to suppress quality of life at its point of origin. This is true of almost every theater where terrorism was practised.

Amir Mir is rightly frightened of terrorism’s impact on Pakistan.

19 November 2006

"Shameful Flight" by Stanley Wolpert

This book is about the last years of British rule of India – an unwise partition, an incompetent colonial government, and a botched up migration leaving bitter legacies. The author is UCLA’s Professor Emeritus teaching history with several other books about India to his credit.

The book is outstanding for many reasons: It is written in an easy style that would force you to read it one go, quite rarely seen in books covering history. Yet the book has sufficient background research that can only be expected from UCLA’s professor of history. It has a balanced presentation of facts by a scholar far removed by geography and time from the events.
Stanley Wolpert provides some interesting insights:

British rule of India is a tale of incompetence:

In 1943, India produced 50 million tons of food grains – enough to feed its population of 400 million. Yet 1.5 million people died of starvation in Bengal that year primarily due to mismanagement.

Bengal’s governor Herbert and Viceroy Lord Wavell pleaded for food grains. Britain’s war transport minister Baron Frederick James Leathers kept 6 million tons stored in ships in Indian Ocean but did not spare it for the starving. Wavell’s report to an uninterested Prime Minister Churchill says “the famine in Bengal was largely due to ministerial incompetence”.

The incompetence was acknowledged in London as well. Churchill’s Secretary of State for India Leopold Amery confesses in a private letter to the Viceroy Linlithgow “nothing has convinced me more than the Cabinet meetings…. of the fundamental incapacity of a British cabinet to try and govern India”.

Viceroy Wavell condemns Churchill four years later after sitting in one cabinet meeting: “He hates India and everything to do with it. Winston knows as much of the Indian problem as George III did of the American colonies!”


British rule of India is a tale of political insensitivity.

The best example of this insensitivity is Winston Churchill’s peevish telegram to his Viceroy asking “why Gandhi has not died yet?” after releasing the Mahatma from prison because of medical conditions. Not a class-act in international politics.


Partition could have been avoided with greater wisdom in Indian/British leadership.

In 1937 provincial elections the Congress won clear majority in six of the eleven provinces. Jinnah’s Muslim league failed to win a single province. Jinnah appealed to Nehru to agree to a coalition Congress-League ministries in the multicultural provinces. Nehru refused and retorted that there were only two parties left: “the British and the Congress”. Jinnah devoted the next ten years to create Pakistan. If Nehru had pursued an “inclusive style of politics” there would have been no opportunity to “divide and rule”.

1946 offered another opportunity to unite. British Secretary of State, Lord Pethick Lawrence advocated a coalition cabinet (made up of Congress and Muslim League) that decides by consensus (as coalitions normally do) and not by majority vote. Nehru declined to cede parity to Muslim league and share power. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad sadly reflected in his autobiography that “Jawaharlal’s mistake in 1937 had been bad enough. The mistake of 1946 proved even more costly”. This resolved Jinnah to insist on partition.

Britain played the “divide and rule” card to the long term detriment of India. Viceroys were quick to ignore good examples. Chief Ministers Sikandar Hayat Khan and Fazl-i-Husain governed Punjab province by using local patriotism and common language to unify the multi-religious Punjab society. It was the same Punjab that recorded the largest death triggered by inept governing.


British rule had no strategy to deal with partition.

Britain, as a colonial ruler, has a history of shameful behaviour. In 1942, when Britain exited Burma “the civil administration suddenly collapsed and those in charge sought their own safety. Private motor cars were commandeered for the evacuation of Europeans, leaving their owners stranded. …. The city of Rangoon was left at the mercy of …. hardened criminals”. There was no thought for life after British rule.

Months ahead of independence most of the British staff were evacuated to Britain leaving no credible law enforcement mechanism for the infant governments of India and Pakistan to deal with the migration induced violence and death.

Mountbatten was aware of the likely violence and the lack of a plan to deal with this. Though Cyril Radcliffe’s maps with the boundary lines of India and Pakistan were ready earlier, Mountbatten kept it under lock and key until the pageantry, splendor and photo opportunities of the Independence day were over and the British could no more be blamed for the violence or the ineptitude with which it was handled. His reasoning: “the earlier it was published, the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances which would undoubtedly result”. Reasonable opportunity to manage the migration was denied for the sake of glory.

Says Bengal Secretary John Dawson Tyson, “Mountbatten’s focus was on withdrawal in fairly peaceful conditions….. the India after 15 August will not be the kind of country I should want to live in”

Rear Admiral Viscount Lord Louis Francis Albert Victor Mountbatten expressed what he thought about the way he had done his job in India to BBC’s John Osmon in 1965. Thirty nine years later Osman says that though he dislikes using vulgar slang, the only honest way of reporting accurately what the last Viceroy said was “I fu….d it up”.

Stanley Wolpert concludes that both India and Pakistan are still saddled with the bitter legacies of Great Britain’s hasty, shameful flight.

Excellent book.

30 October 2006

"The Shawshank redemption" directed by Frank Darabont

I had the DVD with me for a while but did not see the movie because the title and the blurb were not helpful in understanding what this movie was about. Got curious last year when a nephew's blog proclaimed his interest in the movie. The curiosity was not enough to vault over the mental stumbling blocks.

Yesterday I got lucky. Saw the movie.

Wow. Wow. Whew.

No wonder this 1994 Morgan Freeman/Tim Robbins movie is voted as Number 2 in the 250 all time best movies by participants in the "Internet Movie Database".

The story is about an innocent banker being sentenced to life imprisonment in the Shawshank prison system; his journey through the sentence; the "hope" he carefully nurtures against all forces in the prison; the protection of "something inside him" that he does not allow others to touch; and his clever adaptation into and manipulation of the system.

I bet this movie would "touch" you in a way you dont expect it to; and would leave you with a faint smile.

I plan to see this movie again. And again.

Funny the movie, an adaptation of Stephen King's novel, did not do that well in the box office (thanks to Pulp Fiction and Speed); but had a dream run in the home video market.

If you have not seen it so far, you are lucky. You could enjoy seeing it for the first time!

28 October 2006

"A Call to Honour: in service of emergent India" by Jaswant Singh

Jaswant Singh is a solider turned Statesman inspired by another soldier turned Statesman: Charles de Gaulle. No wonder the book’s title mimics de Gaulle’s war memoir “The call to honour”.

The first paragraph is erudite; scholastic and a put off. After that the book gets very warm, inviting and enjoyable.

Early days in Jasol and Khuri are described in a vivid Arundathi Roy style. The sense of freedom and joy a young bride (Jaswant's mother) feels when traveling from her in law’s place to her parent’s place; the mild anxiety of a grandfather to get his weekly fix of opium; the anguish of a grandfather whose peace and prosperity is challenged by a mindless partition in 1947 are all conveyed in a style that would win attention.

Jaswant Singh does not waste your time. He moves fast forward from his younger days in Jasol and Khuri to becoming a Minister in Vajpayee’s cabinet.

The reader gets a first person’s account of

(a) India’s explosion of nuclear devices; the philosophy behind the bomb; and the management of the impact the explosion had in India’s relationship with US, G8, China and Pakistan
(b) Blow hot blow cold relationship with Pakistan where people are courteous to each other in person and vitriolic in their public postures
(c) The Kargil war in 1999 and the Military stand off with Pakistan in 2001
(d) The Kandahar hijack incident
(e) Building a relationship with US that is independent of US relationship with Pakistan and
(f) Building a relationship with China.

One gets the comfort that politics is not all that bad in New Delhi:

(a) R Venkatraman, Minister of Defence in Indira Gandhi’s cabinet, takes into confidence Jaswant Singh in the Opposition benches of the cabinet’s decision to explode nuclear devices in 1980 (though the explosion was cancelled in the last minute by Indira Gandhi)

(b) Prime Minister Narasimha Rao while transitioning Government to Prime Minister Vajpayee says “I wanted to explode these devices but could not. Now it is up to you”.

Both incidents point to a deep respect for other players in politics and a willingness to put India ahead of competitive advantage in politics.

Jaswant Singh too displays this maturity. He has strong criticisms against Congress party and Jawaharlal Nehru. However these criticisms seem to stem from anguish and not hatred; does not reduce the respect a reader may have for Congress or Nehru.

The book has some disappointments. Jaswant Singh does not talk about Ayodhya incident or Godhra incident in great detail. He does not talk about divisive politics between Vajpayee and Advani. Or the Tehelka scandal and how his party tried to stifle an investigative reporter. They too were part of India’s history when Jaswant Singh was in the ring and the reader would have had a more balanced understanding of Jaswant’s time.

All said, an outstanding book by an outstanding son of India who served his country well.

His grandfather who told him to “Go to Delhi and tell them that this (partition of India and Pakistan) was wrong” would be very proud of Jaswant Singh.

26 October 2006

"Kargil: from surprise to victory" by General V P Malik

The head of Indian army is one of the best persons to provide a first person’s account of the Kargil war. If he happens to be an engaging writer, even better. If he has the intellectual honesty to be truthful, it would be a delight.

General V P Malik has done an exceptional job in this book.

He is quite honest, without being critical, about the flawed intelligence; flawed reporting from the frontline; a few failures; and lack of sufficient equipment. However, the story of how the armed forces mobilized its response; how every point was captured back reads well.

Malik gives due credit to the political leadership in India for having the courage to increase the intensity of response without the fear of a nuclear backlash; but is frustrated with the moral high ground of not letting the army cross the line of control into Pakistan.

Malik gives an insight into the strategic thinking in India. Pakistan has the advantage of surprise in a low intensity conflict. Pakistan has parity (thanks to its bomb) in a high intensity conflict. However, India has the advantage in a medium intensity conflict due to a much larger armed forces. (India is a $ 3,800 billion economy while Pakistan is a $ 374 billion economy; in the end, sheer budgetary support would differentiate the two armies in a conventional war).

Pakistan’s thinking was that its nuclear capability would prevent India from escalating the war from low intensity. The political leadership and military leadership in India surprised Pakistan by escalating the response and engaging in a medium intensity conflict without being worried about nuclear responses.

Malik excels at the anecdotal level too. There are heroic stories about how individual peaks and points were captured back. The photographs of the terrain show how difficult the job was.

Reading this book along with Musharraf’s book “In the line of fire” would provide a contrast between India and Pakistan.

One, Malik appears proud of working under his political leadership and seems happy with their support though there are a few disappointments. Musharraf thinks all his political masters were useless.

Two, Malik does not describe Pakistan as an enemy in a passionate way. Malik sounds like a person who would not have minded a vacation in Pakistan if the two nations were friendly. Musharraf whips up passion in Pakistan by painting India as an arch enemy.

Three, Malik is happy to vanish into the wall paper in the political process. The highest level of interference Malik was willing to do was to call the Election Commissioner and complain that it would have been convenient for the army if the EC fixed the election dates after the war was over! Malik and his colleagues are apolitical professionals. Musharraf has emerged as a military dictator.

Four, Malik is quite critical of his country, his army and his political bosses – because he wants his successor to have a better probability of protecting his country. Musharraf cannot find one fault with Pakistan army.

Good book. Reads well.

24 October 2006

"Ghost wars" by Steve Coll

One of the best books written about the emergence of religion based terrorism directed against several causes and several societies. Steve Coll provides a balanced dispassionate analysis and profound insight into the new menace that is powerful enough to challenge peace everywhere.

United States has two kinds of friendships in world politics:

(a) Friendships founded on shared values
(b) Friendships founded on shared interests

Friendships founded on shared values (such as those with UK, Canada, Australia, Germany and Japan) last forever. These friendships do not leave a trail of destruction behind. Friendships founded on shared interests (such as those with Iran under the Shah, Philippines under Marcos, Pakistan under Zia, Saudi Arabia above oil) last short periods of time but leave a trail of destruction somewhere.

US friendship with two such shared interests (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) has created a monster that is likely to be a greater challenge to peace and security everywhere than anything humanity has seen so far.

Saudi Arabia has been funding radical Islamic groups around the world to appease its domestic constituency of religious right. Saudi donations helped create radical Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan to attract, train and equip youth who are willing to kill and willing to die.

Pakistan provided an intelligence service that could orchestrate insurgency against a conventional army; provided a limitless supply of youth willing to die for holy causes; and an efficient supply chain of high tech arms.

United States used this friendship to create a "jehad" against Soviet expansionism. The mission was successful. But there were unfortunate side effects.

The Jihadists, assembled against Soviet Union, did not go home to become investment bankers and stock brokers. They stayed and sought new causes. Fight for Palestine. Fight against America. Fight against the House of Saud. Fight for Islamic rule in Afghanistan. Fight for liberation of Kashmir.

Pakistan had a field day. The ISI could use the jihadists for its favourite causes: Hekmatyar, Taliban, Kashmir. State sponsored terrorism was born. Funding was available from Saudi Arabia and from narcotics trade. State sponsored terrorism gave way to a multinational radical Islamic terrorism when Pakistan tainted every political objective with a religious colour (a lesson learnt from the jihad against Soviets). It is now possible for a Mullah in a village in Pakistan to issue a fatwah by fax that could motivate a young British Muslim to enroll in an ISI sponsored terrorism training center in Pakistan and undertake a mission to destroy social fabric in a nation that is probably busy with a super bowl.

A foreign policy shaped by shared interests is probably not that good an idea.

This book provides a well researched insight into the rise of radical Islamic terrorism.

The best on the subject. Easy to read. Disturbing to think about.

Shall look forward to the next book from Steve Coll.

21 October 2006

"DC Confidential" Christopher Meyer

Christopher Meyer was UK's ambassador to USA during the run up the Iraq war.

You would have thought this is likely to provide an insight into the alignment of views between the two leading democracies of the World, right?

Forget it. This book is boring.

All you get to read are:
(a) Britain's embassy in Washington DC; and next house neighbour Al Gore's copter disturbing peace in the neighbourhood
(b) Meyer's tracking of Presidential polls in USA to find out who is likely to win
(c) Political infighting between PM's office and Foreign ministry occasionally denying Meyer presence in high level parleys
(d) Germany's insensitivity in helping Her Majesty's Ambassador's wife winning a custody battle in German courts

Anglo American relationship is an important force in world polity. We shall await a book from Tony Blair or Dubya Bush to get insight into that.

As to this book, let it remain confidential.

20 October 2006

"In the line of Fire" by Pervez Musharraf

A memoir by a ruling Head of State of Pakistan! Without the measured expression by seasoned diplomacy! This is an exciting opportunity to discover what is ahead for Pakistan, mankind's fight against terrorism and for neighbour India.

Written in a racy style that keeps the reader engaged, the book does not disappoint.

Pervez Musharraf is quite outspoken about Pakistan. A few examples:

"Bhutto was the worst thing that happened to Pakistan. He did more damage to the country than anyone else, damage from which we have still not fully recovered"

"President Zia, in the 1980s, completed what Bhutto had started in the dying phase of his regime - the total appeasement of the religious lobby". "Zia found it convenient to align himself with the religious right and create a supportive constituency for himself".

"The four changes of prime minister involved two cycles of alteration between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Never in the history of Pakistan had we seen such a combination of the worst kind of governance - or rather, a nearly total lack of governance - along with corruption and the plunder of national wealth".

"We stood at the brink of being declared a failed state, a defaulted state, or even a terrorist state".

In four short quotes he disapproves the governance of Pakistan from 1971 to 1999.

Musharraf does admire one ruler of Pakistan however: Pervez Musharraf. He does make moderate claims to qualities of head and heart as a leader - to the extent one can expect in an autobiography. Every dictator or despot nurtures an ambition to claim legitimacy by seeking backing from his/her constituency. Musharraf claims his by bringing in the right mixture of national interests, a poor "state of the union", army support, a referendum and a convenient quote from Abraham Lincoln!

However, what surprises this Indian reader, is an antipathy toward India supported by misrepresentations and deceit:

Musharraf claims that India attacked Pakistan first in 1965 and was given a "bloody nose". Some might say that Pakistan sent its 2nd tank regiment into Jammu first. India halted it and advanced just miles short of Lahore and Sialkot when a UN brokered ceasefire stopped the war.

Musharraf also claims that India, with USSR alliance, invaded Pakistan in 1971 at a time when Pakistan was dealing with mass public uprising in the East. Musharraf ignores the millions of refugees that poured into India thanks to severe threats to normal life from Pakistan's Army. He claims India had an alliance of war with USSR and Pakistan's ally US was not supportive. Truth is different. The only super power to enter the war theater was the US. However, the Indian Army took complete control over the war theater for the US 7th fleet to play any active role and US backed off in the absence of achievable objectives.

Musharraf's recollection of Kargil is at best funny. He claims that "local freedom fighters" occupied Kargil in a maneuver that was "flawless tactical marvel of military professionalism" and Nawaz Sharif lost it in a truce brokered by US. Fact: It was Pakistan's army (Northern Light Infantry) that occupied Kargil. It was a tactical win at a Captain's level and a strategic failure at a General's level. The Indian Army discovered this late (and was criticized in India for this); but the Indian Army fought back and re-occupied all strategic heights. The US brokered truce happened after the re-occupation.

Musharraf stakes a final claim: That the Indian nuclear program used Dr AQ's design. This is a bit mixed up. India exploded its device in 1974. Dr AQ was at that time a young and brilliant metallurgy engineer in Delft in the Netherlands; it would take him another fifteen years to get a dirty bomb for Pakistan.

Musharraf, as a loyal Commander in Chief, tries to paint a larger than life size image for his Army. That is understandable. However, he does not worry about its impact on those who look to him for peace in the neighbourhood and elsewhere. That is worrying.

The leader of Paksitan is quite an important person for humanity's future. Because he can make a big difference on two major issues affecting humanity:

One, Pakistan is the biggest supplier of terrorists today. This supply chain misuses a great religion to provide motivation, drug trade to raise capital, and a vast accumulation of equipments from the cold war era for ammunition.

Two, Pakistan has the power to destroy. This power will have to be carefully handled. By wise, stable and mature hands. One would have thought Musharraf is the best person to control Pakistan's bomb. This book reduces that comfort.

Everyone would agree with one thing Musharraf says in his book. When one sees young Shahid Afridi hit sixers in a cricket match at will, one does feel like jumping with joy like a child. That, at least, is unquestionably true.