"The Leopard and the Fox" by Tariq Ali

Tariq Ali wrote this as a play for BBC.  The execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by Military dictator Zia Ul Haque’s administration would have made a great story.  In the last minute BBC backed off citing concerns about libel suits (after Tariq Ali declined to remove sections alleging US involvement in green lighting Bhutto’s hanging).

The book begins like a volcano and ends like the effervescence of a pop soda (quite the opposite of a good O’Henry story).

It is not easy staging a coup.  Zia has to slowly build consensus while playing a polite general to the arrogant Prime Minister.  In the end Zia takes over as an interim administrator "only until" an elected government takes over.  Zia advises Bhutto to retire abroad.  Bhutto does not listen.  Bhutto thinks he would come back.

Zia administration slaps a murder charge against Bhutto.  Nawab Mohammed Ahmed Khan, the father of a local politician Ahmed Raza Qasuri (who was openly threatened by Bhutto in Pakistan parliament) died in a shoot out in Nov 1974.  Bhutto was named as a conspirator by Qasuri.

Trials at lower court, at high court and at the Supreme Court were more about form than substance.  The Supreme court awarded death sentence to Z A Bhutto.  Zia declined to invoke his power to show mercy.

Until this part the play appears authentic. 

The very last act alleges that Bhutto died in the cell and he was “hanged” again for form.  Author Tariq Ali confesses that this was a rumor that lost credence with the passage of years.  However, Tariq Ali ought to have used the intervening years to correct the anomaly.  History should record that Bhutto was “executed” by Zia administration.

The book lacks the powerful narrative one has come to expect from Tariq Ali and appears to be a mediocre play covering an important incident. 

Perhaps a different and excellent article covering the same subject spoils me:  “Judicial murder of aPrime Minister” 

Guess who wrote that?  Tariq Ali!

"What was once East Pakistan" by Syed Shahid Husain

Syed Shahid Husain was a middle level civil servant sent from West Pakistan to work in civil administration of a district in East Pakistan.  He had sufficient seniority in the administration to provide him a front row seat to watch the events as they unfolded and an insider perspective of the events that led to the birth of Bangladesh.

Syed Shahid Husain considers it important for history to preserve various narratives to ensure right lessons are learnt and confesses to a strong bias for democracy and some antipathy against brutal military assault on an unsuspecting civilian population in his recording of the events:

1. The 1971 event was not a civil war.  Nor was it a rebellion.  It was just a civil resistance movement and an assault on a civilian population by its own military.
2. One cannot blame Bhutto (he was hardly in a position to influence events); one cannot blame India (it waited for 9 months for military rulers to see sense and reach a settlement with compatriots in East).
3. Bengalis had cause to resent domination by the Western half.  In the district for which he was commissioner, debates and discussions degenerated into acrimony and civil officials from East were “not talking” with civil officials posted from the Western half.
4. Bengalis were peaceful people.  As an administrator of a town in KP, he oversaw more than 10,000 licenses for arms.  When he moved to East Pakistan he was surprised to notice that a comparable town had less than 12 licenses.  However, the same Bengalis acquired enough arms to be capable of disrupting military movements within 3 months after the 25 Mar 1971 military crackdown
5. The military government in East Pakistan came to a complete standstill after boycott by people (in response to the postponement of convening the elected legislature).  Husain had to shut down the district administration offices at the request of his subordinates since none of them was willing to work.  Banks stopped transferring money to the Western half; or accept Treasury notes from Federal Government.  When Admiral Ahsan resigned his position as Governor of East Pakistan in protest against military actions, no judge in East Pakistan was willing to administer oath of office to his replacement General Tikka Khan.
6. The army did commit despicable crimes against its own people in the East:
1. Whenever General Niazi visited an operational area, he would make ti a point to ask his troops how many Hindus they had killed.  
2. Brigadier Abdullah Khan of 23 Brigade issued an order in writing to kill Hindus.  
3. Major Mumtaz Khan told the author that his unit swooped upon a village and killed every one in the village (men, women and children).  A baby survived and was crying.  The Major pleaded with his colleagues to “finish off the baby”.  The colleagues refused because they felt the baby deserved to die a slow death.  
4. Ayub Khan, in his diary entry on 11 Nov 1971, records that a “young army officer brought to the CMH Rawalpindi for psychiatric treatment had supposedly killed nearly 14,000 people in East Pakistan.  
5. However, the author is aware that the Bengalis committed some despicable crimes as well.
7. Popular opinion in the Western half did not have sympathy for the East.  Intellectuals in Karachi felt that “the crackdown was long overdue and probably justified”.  
8. Nixon and Kissinger, according to the author, were devoid of any morality and ethics and failed to realize the magnitude of the crisis.
9. To the author, 1971 was the year of national infamy for Pakistan.   

The book is a demonstration of another unconfessed bias:  a bias for truth.  The book is a testament to the author’s courage to speak truth to power.

"War and secession" by Richard Sisson & Leo E Rose

The birth of Bangladesh (earlier East Pakistan) and the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 were covered by many writers from India and Pakistan.  Despite best efforts, the narratives tend to differ significantly and the subject merits an objective analysis by unbiased scholars who understand the region.

Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose do just that.  Both are scholars in political sciences (Sisson headed Ohio State University and Rose taught at Berkeley); and both specialized in South Asia (with several books to their credit).

Interesting snippets from this excellent book:

The territorial disputes between India and Pakistan are the result of “a hastily devised and extremely sloppy” partitioning of India.  Contiguity, will of the ruler and will of the people were to be heeded in deciding who goes where.  Pakistan had differing principles for different regions.  Pakistan preferred will of the ruler in Junagadh and Hyderabad (where the ruler was Muslim and the people Hindus) and will of the people in Kashmir (where the ruler was Hindu and people Muslim).  India had the opposite view.  India annexed the first two by force and Kashmir in a controversial accession.  The 1949 war between the two young nations over Kashmir resulted in a ceasefire line splitting Kashmir into two parts:  Pakistan held Kashmir and India held Kashmir.  In the 1965 war, India made deep inroads into PHK; but had to give up territory gained under the Tashkent peace treaty.

The first free and fair elections in Pakistan in 1970 resulted in “a majority party with a regional agenda and a minority party with a national agenda”.  One argued for majority’s will to prevail and a weak federation.  Another argued for right to participate in government based on “concurrent majority of two separate interests”.  Bhutto represented a region and had a national program.  Mujib represented the nation and had a regional program.  Military dictator Yahya Khan could not devise a solution and unleashed armed force against Bengalis when they expressed angst at continuing inaction.  (Sisson and Rose say that while Bengalis suffered as a result, the Indian claims of “genocide” are exaggerated). 

Pakistan made several miscalculations:

1. That the Bengalis in the East will submit quickly to armed force.  They did not.  Bengalis fought back.  Their Mukthi Bahini grew to a size of 100,000 fighters.  They liberated Bangladesh from Pakistan. 
2. That India will not intervene in the conflict.  India intervened. 
3. That Hindu India’s army is no match for Pakistan army drawn from the martial warrior community of Punjab Muslims.   In the end Pakistan Army surrendered to three Generals of a secular India: a Parsi, a Sikh and a Jew!
4. That China will intervene to restrain India in the event of hostilities.  China did not.  India knew (from intercepted communication) that China promised political support but declined to provide military support to Pakistan.  Additionally India’s treaty with the Soviet Union deterred China from any intervention.  India was confident enough to move 6 of the 10 battalions from its borders with China to its borders with Pakistan.
5. That a conflict in Western border would distract India.  It did not.  India took back several territories in PHK and the new 1971 “line of control” replaced the earlier 1949 “cease fire line”.

The authors observe a few ironies:  Decision making in India was institutionalized and controlled by incumbents “who had been there before”.  Decision makers in Pakistan labored under severe and self-admitted stress.  Democratic India had “strong and consistent” control over the crisis.  Authoritarian Pakistan was relatively “weak and inconsistent”.  India was the “hard” state; Pakistan was the “soft” state.   Pakistan’s policy (with Awami League and later with India) was reflexive and more focused on denying India satisfaction than achieving a domestic resolution – an incorrect priority that lost the country a region, a border and some reputation.

"Pakistan on the brink: the future of America, Pakistan and Afghanistan" by Ahmed Rashid

Ahmed Rashid, rebel (who organized uprisings against Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan governments) turned journalist (20 years with Daily Telegraph out of Lahore), provides a balanced analysis of the end game scenario in the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan imbroglio.  You dont need to have read his previous masterpieces ("Taliban" and "Descent into Chaos").  You can read any chapter at random.  I had to read the entire book in one go.  Quite an engaging analysis.

United States is in a logjam.  US has to exit Afghanistan soon.  Popular support for the war has decreased.  The adventure is a drain on national purse at the time of recession.  In order to make elegant exit US needs a legitimate government acceptable to various ethnic groups in Afghanistan that is capable of enforcing law and order.  The bets US made on (a) armed force (b) friendly Afghan government (c) animosity with Taliban and (d) trusting Pakistan to support its war efforts in destroying Al Qaeda are all not working.  Throwing money into Afghanistan or Pakistan did not work either.  Can US exit Pakistan elegantly?  Or will it just “switch off the lights” and make for the door unmindful of the post exit mess?

Afghanistan is in a logjam.  It is an ethnically divided society where Pashtuns (the majority) and non-Pashtuns (Tajiks, Uzbeks etc) do not get along well.  The current government came to power in a sham election with insufficient representation for the majority Pashtun; and is very corrupt.  The Afghan army is not well balanced (disproportionately low number of Pashtuns); is weak and suffers high desertion.  Government maintains rule with the help of US led forces.  In the last ten years, thanks to US money, the non-Pashtuns have gotten rich; and the Pashtuns have remained poor.  97% of the economy depends on international military spending.  When US exits, Afghanistan will slip into a deep recession.

Afghan Taliban is in a logjam.  They are Afghan nationalists; not global jihadists.  Their only fault was supporting Al Qaeda.  They are willing to talk and participate in the Afghan government.  However, they were removed from power by US army and are residing in Pakistan based sanctuaries under the control of Pakistan’s ISI.  ISI pressured them to launch fresh insurgencies against US army from Pakistan (providing them money, ammunition and training).  They suffer US retaliation.  It has become a war of US drones v Taliban IEDs.  Both are losing.  Germany and Qatar organized clandestine peace talks between Taliban and US without the knowledge of Pakistan.  This has stalled.  Taliban paid a price for their friendship with Al Qaeda; and are paying a price for their friendship with Pakistan.  US is interested in fighting them; Pakistan is not.

Pakistani Taliban are not in a logjam.  The group was born when Afghan Taliban started recruiting from Pakistan Pashtuns to provide manpower support.  They were joined by militants from Kashmir (who found life boring after Pakistan made a temporary truce with India to deal with the mess in Afghan border) and by militants from Punjab, Sind and other provinces.  Pakistani Taliban killed more than 1,000 traditional tribal leaders friendly to Pakistan State.  They see Pakistan State as an enemy (for having provided tacit support to US drone attacks) and pursue terrorism within Pakistan (with a sophisticated, educated and urban edge thanks to their Punjab/Sind brethren).  Their aim is to establish an Islamic caliphate ignoring political borders.  Pakistan is interested in fighting them; US is not.

Haqqani network is not in a logjam.  Jalaluddin Haqqani's network enjoys Pakistan's support; is held in high esteem by both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban; is a friend of Al Qaeda; and is clear about inimical interests against US.  US is unable to defeat the network since US is unable to pursue the network’s warriors into Pakistani soil.  US is keen to fight them; Pakistan is not.

Al Qaeda is not in a logjam.  They are global jihadists.  They inherited all training camps for militants in Afghanistan from the Taliban.  They provided inspiration, training and equipment to a multitude of radical youth (some from US/Europe).  Their leader Osama bin Laden was killed.  However, they have morphed into a network of tiny cells and can cause damage if they are provided a place to stay.  Pakistan, under pressure from US, has been “outing” Al Qaeda leaders.  However, Pakistan are unable to explain whether bin Laden’s residence near Pakistan’s capital is due to culpability or incompetence.  Mystery remains.

Pakistan is in a logjam. 

1. Pakistan is continuing to be dominated by its army.  Civil government is weak, corrupt and powerless. Democracy is made difficult since all parties, other than PPP, are ethnic or regional.  Punjab (thanks to constituting 60% of population) dominates civil service and army and others feel underprivileged.
2. Pakistan political elite have failed to create a national identity that unifies the country.  The army’s anti-India security paradigm has filled the void to define national identity making the army the most important component of governance.
3. Army commandeers 30% of Pakistan budget, 70% of all aid and has grown to be an empire of tax free industries and real estate with motivation and ability to exercise power over defense and foreign policy.
4. Pakistan army has been using proxy forces (tribals and jihadists) to achieve security objectives.  Pakistan army used proxies in its attempts to liberate Kashmir in 1947 and 1965; to subdue secession in 1971; to evict (this time with success) Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1988; and to unleash insurgency in Kashmir in 1989.  Pakistan sees Afghan Taliban as a very useful proxy to retain influence in Afghanistan and an assortment of militant outfits as very useful to bleed India in Kashmir.  However, these initiatives have created the 40,000 strong Pakistani Taliban, which is not under state control and is attempting to destroy Pakistan state itself.
5. Pakistan, in attempting to secure a strategic depth against India has destabilized Afghanistan by supporting one ethnic group (Pashtuns) and antagonizing other groups.  Pakistan is dreaming of an Afghan state that is neither too weak (to be dominated by inimical interests) nor too strong (to threaten Pakistan’s borders and claim sovereignty over Pashtuns in Pakistan).  Pakistan is dreaming of an Afghan state where Pashtuns dominate.  Pakistan is dreaming of an Afghan state where Iran will not have influence over the Shias (Iran has invested significantly into nation building in Afghanistan) and India over Tajiks/Uzbeks (India has invested significantly into nation building; 50% of goods leaving for India now use roads to Iran and bypass Karachi).  Pakistan is an impediment to Afghan stability; and therefore to Pakistan’s stability.
6. Pakistan army and civil government have been feeding popular opinion with false narratives against US, Israel and India whipping up paranoia about the very existence of Pakistan being at stake.  This prevents evolution of a good choice of policies for Pakistan.
7. Pakistan can no longer depend upon US as a hedge against India.  Nor can Pakistan rely on China for monetary support.  China is not known to give cash; nor is China comfortable with terrorism as state policy.

It would take a confident President, a wise General and a compassionate Mullah to break the logjams and bring stability and end to the “New Great Game”.  Until then, everyone would suffer in each other's duplicity.

Ahmed Rashid provides an excellent insight into the tapestry of interlinked and conflicting motivations; an insight reinforced by personal knowledge of and discussions with Obama, Karzai, and Musharraf.

"Inside the Pakistan Army" by Carey Schofield

Carey Schofield has two claims to write this book:

1.   She (as a woman) spent time at the frontline with Pakistan army and

2.  She resided in Pakistan long enough to consider it her second home.

She had access to several Generals and Corps Commanders of Pakistan Army.

You would have thought she would provide an insight into an Army that is into business; into political rule; pursuing a global policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound; and in the words of one Pakistan Prime Minister, had more success in fighting its people inside Pakistan than its adversaries outside.

Instead, Carey’s book looks more like propaganda material written by an admirer with very little insight into Pakistan Army’s impact on Pakistan’s prosperity and peace.

Two samples that make me believe this is more an essay by an indoctrinated school girl writing about her sponsors than an academic’s research into an institution of importance in a country of importance to the world:

1.  “Pakistan army may be flawed; but it is the best we have got”.  (Nice yardstick!)

2.  “I liked Mr Zardari; he was original and funny, and unassuming” (Am sure the President of Pakistan is more than that).

Waste of time.

There are many other excellent books about Pakistan Army.

"Myths and Facts: Bangladesh Liberation War" by B Z Khasru

The recent declassification of US Government archives has provided a rich mine of information on US behavior during the1971 war between India and Pakistan that liberated Bangladesh.

B Z Khasru, a US based journalist, has done extensive research of this newly declassified data to bring additional information about the 1971 events.

It was Bhutto, not Mujib, who broke Pakistan, says General Yahya Khan in an affidavit issued just before his death.  All that Mujib-ur-Rahman wanted was for Bengal to have its fair share of growth, jobs, public purse and foreign aid; and the opportunity to grow through trade with India.  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had a tacit preference to let East Pakistan secede (and leave the West to be governed by Bhutto) than be subject to a weak federation ruled by Bengalis.  Bhutto preferred power than Pakistan.

Yahya was no angel either.  His motivation to conduct elections was the probability of getting to stay in power for a long period of time since his Intelligence officers advised him that the elections might not result in a clear majority and the framing of a new constitution within 120 days after the elections is unlikely.  His allusion to Mujib as the future PM of Pakistan was more to scare the politicians in the West and the army to unite.

However, Khasru’s book is more about how US misplaced its principles and misread the tea leaves.

Nixon and Kissinger saw the entire problem through the narrow prism of securing friendship with China through the benevolence of Yahya Khan.

1.     The aspirations of 75 million people in the East and the genocide unleashed on them were not important.  When US Consul at Dacca, Archer Blood, accused the US Government of “moral bankruptcy” for its “posture of pretending to believe Pakistan Government’s false assertions”, Nixon recalled Blood and transferred him to Personnel.

2.     The focus was on keeping Yahya Khan pleased since he was the conduit to the secret parley with China.   US would continue to publicly support Yahya’s unified Pakistan; if East Pakistan requires US support, US would decline to give such a support “based on the premise that in US opinion West Pakistan would not use force to bring a solution”.

Nixon and Kissinger were amazingly consistent in “misreading” the tea leaves:

1.     Kissinger theorized that India would not want an independent Bangladesh since that would induce India’s West Bengal province to secede from India and unite with Bangladesh!

2.     Nixon preferred to support Pakistan wherever possible because “Yahya was more decent to US than Indira Gandhi was”.  Kissinger agreed, “Yahya was decent and reasonable if not politically smart”.

3.     Kissinger felt Indian occupation of Bangladesh would be even more violent and would make Pakistan’s occupation look like child play.  When Indian army entered Dacca, Nixon was surprised to see locals welcoming the liberating army and asked: “You see those people welcoming the Indian troops.  Why then are we going through this agony?” Kissinger replied:  “To prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed; to retain our Chinese arm; to preserve balance of power with the Soviet Union”.

Nixon had a strong bias against India.  In his private conversations with Kissinger, Indians were referred to as “cowards” and “savages”.  Nixon tried to support Pakistan in several ways:

1.     When his State department disagreed with Kissinger that US owed arms support to Pakistan (when Pakistan invoked the bilateral agreement with US and sought arms), Nixon orchestrated provision through intermediary countries.  Jordan did provide aircrafts and pilots to Pakistan.  Iran agreed to but rescinded in the last minute.  Kissinger admitted in 1972 to China that US supplied arms via third countries.  The augmentation did not have an impact.

2.     Nixon urged China to move troops to the Indian border saying “The Indians have got to get a little scared”. China did not oblige because of its concerns about Soviet intervention under the Indo Soviet treaty.

3.     Nixon moved US Seventh fleet to Bay of Bengal to increase threat perceptions though this did not have any impact on the war.

4.     Nixon warned Soviet Union that any help to India would leave a scar in US-Soviet relationship for many years after the war ended.  Nixon told a visiting Soviet minister: “The Indians are cowards.  They are raping and murdering.  They are pretty vicious”.  (Historians would consider this to be a Presidential lie).  Kissinger felt Nixon’s statement would make Soviets reduce their support to India.  They did not.

In Khasru's book, Indira Gandhi emerges as a good leader.  She worked on domestic opinion before supporting Mukti Bahini.  She worked on international opinion before invading East Pakistan.  She read the geopolitical scenario rightly and concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union to ensure China does not start any conflict to step up pressure against India.  She was firm in declining to conform to UN resolution (orchestrated by Nixon) to ceasefire and withdraw from each other’s territories (the usual end for every India Pakistan war in the past). 

In the end it came down to Nixon and Kissinger not reading an important import of that amazing document, the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, which read: “Whenever any government becomes destructive of man’s inalienable rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, it was the right of the people to alter or abolish it”.

"The last days of United Pakistan" by G W Choudhury

Pakistan started as a homeland for the Muslims of Indian subcontinent in 1947.  That credential was lost in 1971 when Bangladesh separated from Pakistan after a genocide that took 0.4 million to 3.6 million lives (depending on whose narrative you believe).

G W Choudhury provides a unique perspective of the events surrounding the birth of Bangladesh.  His perspective is unique because:  One, GWC is a scholar (he taught political science at Dacca University and later at Duke University).   Two, he is of Bengali origin and has a better understanding of the Bengali point of view.  Three, he was a Minister in General Yahya Khan’s military dictatorship and has unquestionable allegiance to the idea of Pakistan.

Why did Pakistan fail to keep all Muslims united under one flag and face secessionist pressure from a sub set of its Muslims within 24 years?  Why did the Bengali Muslim get alienated from the Pakistan idea?

GWC cites several reasons:

1. Though religion was a unifying factor, language and culture were divisive factors.  The Bengalis in East Pakistan had greater affinity to the Hindu Bengalis of India than fellow Muslims in Pakistan.  Pakistan failed to play the unifying card and alienated Bengalis by attempting to make Urdu spoken in West Pakistan as the national language.  The alienation was so strong that in a provincial election, Muslim League, the national party won just 9 out of 304 seats! 
2. Bengalis did not have a role in national politics despite constituting 55% of Pakistan’s population.  People from Punjab and Sindh in the western half dominated national politics.  (Pakistan’s politics did not provide a role for people in the western half either; it was ruled by military dictatorship or by a sham democracy that did not hold one general election at national level until 1970!). 
3. Bengalis did not have a role in provincial government either.  Most of the top jobs in civil service went to people originating from West Pakistan.
4. Bengalis had a different view on international relations.  Bengalis depended upon trade with India and nursed no animosity against India. (When Mujib was egged by GWC to accept Chinese friendship, Mujib retorted: “Friendship against whom?  I have no dispute with India.  Why should I need China’s help and assistance?”)  National leadership, dominated by the western half, nursed an animosity against India because of its stronger affinity to Kashmir.  GWC concedes in his book that “Pakistan’s hands were not clean in Kashmir or in the Mizo unrest in Assam”. 
5. Bengalis did not enjoy a fair share of public revenue, foreign aid or government jobs.  Most of these went to West Pakistan.  (To be fair, most of the revenue/aid went to the army; not West Pakistan; however that is a technical detail for the average Bengali).
6. The Bengalis did not have their fair share of economic growth as a result. In 1960 West’s GDP was 32% bigger than East’s.  In 1970, West’s GDP was 61% bigger than East’s.

General Yahya Khan decided to transfer power to a government elected by people.  The Eastern half (with 55% population) was fully united behind Awami League party.  The Western half was split amongst various regional factions.  In normal circumstances, Mujib-ur-Rahman, the Bengali leader would have become the Prime Minister of Pakistan.  According to GWC, the people in the western half and the army would have accepted Mujib-ur-Rahman as PM.  

But there were stumbling blocks:

1. Politicians from West Pakistan were not willing to let power go to Bengalis. 
2. Mujib-ur-Rahman’s intentions were not clear.  Though he proposed a six point agenda demanding provincial autonomy, and was not talking of secession there was widespread suspicion that his real intent was secession.

Yahya Khan had to make some tough choices.  Could he trust Mujib to form a government?  Could he pressure Bhutto to accept Mujib’s leadership?  Would Mujib consider the electoral results a mandate for secession and demand secession after becoming PM?  Yahya made his choices and conducted the elections in Dec 1970. 

Results were as below:

	West	East	Total
Mujib		160	160
Bhutto	81		81
Others	57	2	59
Total	138	162	300

Bhutto declined to cede power to Mujib saying “majority rule does not apply in view of geographic distance between East and West Pakistan”.  Mujib was pressing for greater provincial autonomy in a set up where the federal government was virtually powerless.  GWC tried to broker peace with a half way house arrangement.  The negotiations did not yield any result.

After this, the narrative varies based on who you ask.

GWC “concedes” that Pakistan Army (on the fateful day of 25 Mar 1971) unleashed violence on its own people in the East that can never be condoned or justified; but carefully avoids the word “genocide”.  He does say that “foreign newspapers did not exaggerate and in fact people’s agony, suffering and humiliation had not been fully exposed”.  (Neutral observers estimate the number of dead to be around 3.6 million and the number of refugees into India to be 10 million).  Pakistan army brought the peace of the graveyard to the Eastern half.

Burdened by the inflow of refugees, India started providing tacit assistance to Mukti Bahini (the freedom fighters of Bangladesh).  Pakistan started air action against India at the Western border (based on the premise that this would keep Indian army busy and deter any intrusion in the Eastern border; and China/US would prevent escalation).  GWC concedes this strategy was not fruitful.  India invaded East Pakistan and liberated Bangladesh.  The war that Bhutto vowed would last a thousand years lasted just 14 days resulting in decimation of Pakistan army in the East and capture of 93,000 prisoners of war (who were later sent to Pakistan under Simla Accord).

However, GWC’s analysis is not sufficient:

1.     GWC carefully avoids discussion of the loss of 3.6 million lives in East Pakistan under a genocide orchestrated by Pakistan army. 

2.     GWC ignores the fact that Pakistan started the war at the Western front for which India responded by invading East Pakistan.

3.     GWC says India’s victory “with little cost” was due to the full backing (ie moral support) of Russia while US/China did not provide military support (though they provided moral support) to Pakistan.  He misses the asymmetry of his analogy.  He also misses the power of a million aspirations.

4.     GWC laments for Pakistan army’s defeat without air support and “surrounded by a hostile population”.  Very funny.

Anyone interested in the story of Bangladesh should read this book for the insight; but should read at least one more book to get a better perspective of the price paid for “Amar Sona Bangla”.

"The Remains of the day" by James Ivory & Ismail Merchant

Yaghan language (spoken in Tierra del Fuego - the archipelago off the southern tip of South America) has  a word that is considered to be the most succinct (and most difficult to translate to English):  "mamihlapinatapai".  It means the look shared by two people, each hoping that the other will initiate something that both desire but neither is willing to initiate.  Whew.


This 1993 Merchant Ivory movie (of course scripted by Ruth Jhabvala) is an excellent epitome of the "mamihlapinatapai" feeling.  The movie is based on Kazuo Ishiguro's book about the ambiguous relationship between a stoic perfectionist English butler (Anthony Hopkins) and a warm housekeeper (Emma Thompson).  One can sense the love between them; their reluctance to express it first; and their keen desire that the other should express first.  The housekeeper leaves to marry someone else.  Fortune offers another chance twenty years later only to be lost again.  


Anthony Hopkins' Mr Stevens is the perfect butler a master could hope for.  He runs the house with dedication and commitment; is laconic and polite with his master and with his staff.  He manages everything for his master and yet "vanishes into the wall paper" even as leaders of the era visit his master's house to  architect a European unity between the first and the second world war.  He sees nothing; hears nothing and talks nothing and offers no opinion even when the house guests seek his opinion on worldly issues.  Quite a contrast to Isaac Asimov's Henry (the butler serving the Black Widowers) who "engages" with impressive intelligence in the affairs of his guests.    


Emma Thompson's Miss Kenton is a polite and proper lady.  She is slightly warmer than Stevens; slightly less repressed and very subtle in expressing her emotions (be it love or be it anger).  She lets her emotions get through on two occasions: one, when she teases Stevens by enquiring whether he is reading a scandalous book that could hurt her character; another when she cries in her room after announcing her decision to marry Tom.  On both occasions, Stevens "misses the bus" in understanding and reciprocating the feelings.


You feel like intervening into the movie to break the ice.  That is the feeling Kazuo Ishiguro, Ruth Jhabvala, Ismail Merchant and James Ivory wanted you to be left with.


I would rather regret doing something than regret not having done something.  Excellent movie.

"Controversially yours" by Shoaib Akhtar

Shoaib, the Rawalpindi express, is one of the best players of cricket in the game.  He entertained spectators with an exceptionally high quality pace bowling (on occasions exceeding 100 miles per hour).  

Shoaib had the “in your face” and “never say die” attitudes that took him to commanding heights of glory even as the same traits threw several challenges into the journey.

Shoaib had a tough time emerging from his lower middle class youth to pursue a high risk career in cricket; had a tough time in dealing with an unfair employer, a politicized cricket administration, seemingly uninspiring and often hostile coaches, captains and fellow players.  Shoaib had a tough time dealing with his own fitness and his penchant for parties/girls.  However, Shoaib did not have a tough time at all with just one part of his ecosystem:  support and adulation from the countless number of fans not just in Pakistan but also in India and every other country that loves/plays cricket.

Shoaib provides us a lovely glimpse of middle class Pakistan in the chapters dealing with his childhood.  Dad worked in a job that does not pay much but takes care of most aspects of life including education and healthcare.  Mom managed the household within the limited means with dignity.  Education ranked a high priority.  The young boys gauged how “rich” the family was on any day by looking at the size of the knot at the end of their mother’s duppatta (she stored the money in her dress!).  Shoaib aspires to conform to his family ethos and yet seeks to be "free".  Shoaib, by speaking from his heart, enkindles the nostalgia in most of us and inspires renewal of faith in future.  

Shoaib attempts to set the record straight but is not entirely successful:

1. Yes, he tampered balls. His excuse: everyone did it and winning is important.  Not cricket.
2. Yes, he partied a lot.  Yes, there were girls.  No he did not rape. 
3. No, he did not fake injuries.  He genuinely suffered.  His commitment to play bearing his pain with fortitude has not been appreciated.
4. No, Pakistan cricket administration was not supportive.  One was not assured of one’s place in the team unless the non-playing administrators were pampered.
5. Yes, the team knitted well during good days.  No, the team did not knit well during bad days.  On balance, there was more internal strife and hostility than esprit de corps.
6. Yes, there was match fixing.  He did not indulge in one though he was approached.

Shoaib does not have one unkind word for India; recognizes that several of the Pakistan players (including Shoaib and Afridi) enjoy immense popularity in India and is joyous at the support his Kolkatta fans (he played for KKR in Indian Premier League) gave him.  

Shoaib has been candid in commenting about fellow players in Pakistan and elsewhere. His comment about some Indian batsmen playing for their records instead of for winning the game cannot be dismissed as a biased observation.  Whether unfair or not, it comes from his heart.

The one thing that I expected but did not find in the book is his state of mind, the tactical options he considered and executed and their success/failure in crucial match winning moments.  He probably wanted to save it for a private briefing to aspiring pace bowlers in Pakistan so that some day when his record is broken it is done by a Pakistani for the Pakistan team. 

"Hang gliding" at Interlaken, Switzerland

The toughest moment is when you are atop the Alpine cliff awaiting a friendly breeze before running down the brief slope toward crisp clean air far above the beautiful town with hope that nature gives you a nice lift. After that it is pure joy.

Radhika did it too. With a dive and a loop.

"Matters of discretion" by Inder Kumar Gujral

Autobiographies of Prime Ministers (especially ex diplomats) tend to be discreet to the point of being bland. Autobiographies of intellectuals tend to be profound and insightful in their analyses.

Inder Gujral, Prime Minister of India, top diplomat prior to that and an intellectual surprises us twice: One, Gujral expresses his views in a refreshingly honest way; does not hold back. Two, Gujral stays away from discussing any substantive issue India faced/faces.

Gujral's candid biography provides an insider view of the main actors and the games they played in Indian politics for 33 years between 1966 and 1999:

1. Indira Gandhi, to Gujral, cannot be counted upon. Gujral (along with Dinesh Singh and Uma Shankar Dixit) was part of the coterie that helped Indira Gandhi become PM in 1966. Yet she dumped them quite quickly. Gujral had to “fight” to get a ministerial birth in her 1967 administration.

2. Indira Gandhi, to Gujral, was a split and complex personality. Gujral says "She could be mean, petty and vicious; and large hearted, gracious and charming”

3. Indira’s ethics, to Gujral, is suspect. Her Yoga Guru Dhirendra Brahmachari applied pressure on Gujral to get a prime property in Delhi from the Government. Gujral declined. Indira Gandhi demoted Gujral and got the land transferred to Brahmachari. Additionally, Gujral thinks the untimely death of L N Mishra ("the man who knew too much") in a bomb blast raised a few suspicions.

4. Indira Gandhi’s suspension of democracy in India in 1975 was, to Gujral, her worst blunder. “Small men with small minds captured power, and well equipped demolition squads were destroying democratic institutions and suppress or even get rid of Individuals with moral stature and ethical values”. The misadventure was traceable to her affection for son Sanjay Gandhi, unwise advisers such as P N Haksar and sycophants such as N D Tiwari and Shyama Charan Shukla. Soviet Union’s Nikolai M Pegoy regretted to Gujral that “Indira Gandhi must understand that she is a leader first and a mother second”. Her reinvigoration of democracy by calling for elections was because of a misjudgment that she had “smothered opposition and Sanjay has been accepted by a prostrate electorate”. As late as 1984, Pranab Mukherjee and Vasant Sathe in Indira’s cabinet were working on amending the Constitution to a Presidential system with strong limits on the role of opposition!

5. Indira Gandhi’s ordering troops into the Golden Temple was, to Gujral, her second biggest blunder. Congressmen, under Indira Gandhi, created Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale to play one faction against another for electoral purposes; in the end Bhindranwale went out of control. Indira paid with her life. Her son Rajiv’s era began with an anti-Sikh riot that haunts the nation even today.

6. Gujral's deposition to Shah Commission investigating Emergency excesses was a tussle between loyalty and honesty. Arun Shourie best described it as “Gujral trying to please both his present and past masters”.

7. President Sanjiva Reddy, in a visit to Soviet Union (during the days Gujral was India’s diplomat in Moscow), was not keen on discussing any political or economic issue with Soviet leaders. He was keen to take his family out shopping!

8. Ramakrishna Hegde, Chandrasekar and V P Singh deserve credit, according to Gujral, for the formation of Janata Dal in 1988. Hegde lost his parity because of (as Gujral so nicely articulates) “his proclivity for sybaritic comfort and affinity for glitter and glamour” ruptured his image!

9. V P Singh, to Gujral, was “stubborn in not heeding the advice of his colleagues and indecisive till a situation went out of control; he easily played into the hands of sectarian leaders who alienated him from his support base and the media”. Singh’s support to expand quota of “other” backward castes in Government jobs from 22% to 49% (based on recommendations of Mandal Commission) was one such incident that led to the fall of the government within a year.

10. Chandrasekar formed his government in Nov 1990 (with unreliable support from Congress party) that made “the Hindujas, the Ambanis and the Birlas jubilant”. Gujral declined to join Chandrasekar’s cabinet. The Government did not last long.

11. Janata Dal which lost the 1991 elections to Narasimha Rao was dysfunctional; state bosses without any moral compunction gained power over national leaders. Gujral contested this election from Bihar and was shocked to get an offer for “polling booth services” to ensure victory for a price of Rs 150,000 and 50 bullets! Gujral declined. Nor was Gujral impressed by V P Singh asking Gujral to not contest elections and look after a “large sum donated by an unnamed source” to Janata Dal. He declined that offer too.

12. The United Front, a coalition led by dark horse candidate Deve Gowda was beset by unreliable support from Congress party. During this period, Lalu Prasad Yadav loses his seat in Bihar State Legislature thanks to a “fodder scam scandal”. Gujral seems to have helped Lalu to run the state by proxy by helping Lalu’s wife succeed him as CM!

Gujral became Prime Minister in 1997 when Sitaram Kesri (“the old man in a hurry”) withdrew Congress support to Deve Gowda). However, within a short period, Gujral faced significant pressure from Congress party to drop coalition partner DMK from Government (because of allegations against them in Jain Commission investigation of Rajiv Gandhi assassination). Gujral refused to oblige and preferred to resign; in a rare display of timber in Indian politics.

The most shocking (but not surprising) revelation: Karunanidhi sent Minister Aladi Aruna to pressurize Gujral to appoint a preferred candidate as the head of Chennai's port (a lucrative job if one is corrupt) but told the public in TN that the trip was to lobby for TN interests in Kaveri river water dispute between TN and Karnataka! The shock is not about corruption in DMK; the shock is about trivialisation of the fortune of TN farmers!

Gujral may not have intended it; but ends up highlighting the darker side of Indian politicians quite vividly.

"Dairy milk Ad" by Cadbury

A sixer that barely escaped a catch. A century. A young girl in love. A woman who is not inhibited. A cricketer who can hit. A man who is not afraid to be shy and embarrassed. Cadbury daily milk chocolate. Seven things that create the "joie de vivere" mood.



Yes. It is official. This is my favorite ad.

"Liberty or death: India's journey to independence & division" by Patrick French

This book by UK politician Patrick French is junk.

Two examples:

One, the author says India's independence movement would not have worked under Stalin's Russia since Gandhi/Nehru would have been summarily executed. By this logic, Britain would not have had magna carta if Attila the Hun was its King at Runnymede!

Two, the author says that a few "volunteers" and not Pakistan Army invaded Kashmir in 1948. Is this still in dispute? Really? So passe.

Unfortunately I bought Patrick French's 2010 book on India last week; allegedly a history of a billion people. Now, am apprehensive. What is the focus this time? Two billion arm pits?

"Tinderbox, the past and future of Pakistan" by M J Akbar

Pakistan is an idea that was born out of pride in the past and fear of the future; it would neither stabilize nor disintegrate but remain in its current toxic state says M J Akbar, renown author and newsmagazine editor in his book tracing the fascinating story of the birth and growth of Pakistan.

Akbar quotes Maulana Abul Kalam Azad from an interview given to a Lahore magazine in 1946: "After the initial euphoria dies down, divisive pressures would become assertive in Pakistan; the two wings will separate; and regional identities, fueled by outside interference, will result in balkanization. Incompetent political leadership will pave way for military rule; neo rich will loot national wealth and Pakistan will end up being controlled by international conspirators". Quiet a prescient man, Azad was.

What gave rise to Pakistan? Muslim pride and Muslim fear.

The pride of the Indian Muslim is justified. Muslims wielded power in India for 665 years from 1192 to 1857 AD. Though the rulers were Muslim, it was not an Islamic rule. Both the Delhi Sultans and the Moghuls (except an odd Aurangazeb) kept their faith away from statecraft and co-opted Hindu nobility and warriors to add depth and sustainability to their rule. The Muslim population in India too was significantly influenced by the tolerant and compassionate Sufi philosophy.

The fear set in with the gradual weakening and eventual decline of Moghul empire.

Muslim response to this fear of insecurity differed: the Deoband Madrassa, the Barelvis and the Jamat-i-Islami wanted the British out and were willing to live in peace with Hindus in a untied India; the Aligarh Muslim University set up by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan sought to co-operate with the British to carve out special treatment for Muslims including special electorates in provincial and central legislatures.

Muslim politics had five swivel moments eventually leading to the birth of Pakistan:

One, in 1916 Muslims under Jinnah leadership secured Congress agreement for separate electorates (and a united fight against the British)

Two, in 1919 Muslims were outraged by British taking away Islam’s holy mosques from the Ottoman caliph, trusted Gandhi to lead the jihad against the British (only to be disillusioned by Gandhi’s abandonment of the Khilafat movement after a violent incident in Chauri Chaura).

Three, in 1927 Jinnah failed to bridge the gap with Congress when an opportunity arose to draft a Constitution for India. After this the British kept deepening the wedge between Hindus and Muslims.

Four, in 1937 Muslim fear of Hindu domination arose after a provincial election when the victorious Congress declined to form a coalition with the defeated Muslim League. Jinnah swore to convert the dispersed provincial identities and regional leaderships into a “national minority”.

Five, in 1946 Muslims were disappointed at Congress, fearful of balkanization, reversing its decision to adopt a federal structure constitution for a united India. This resulted in partition and the birth of Pakistan unavoidable and in the best interest of everyone.

Post partition, Pakistan lived up to Azad’s predictions.

The ruling class co-opted faith into politics; sabotaged weak attempts at land reform; and left people in poverty. Jinnah’s dream of a secular state with muslim majority was ignored. Instead, as dreamt by Maulana Maudidi, theocratic urges were patched into legislative framework.

The emergence of Pakistan as an Islamic state was gradual. In 1949 the Constitutional Assembly subjected the young state to principles of Islamic faith. In 1956 the new Constitution made the country an Islamic republic. In 1962 General Ayub Khan added the Islamiyat curriculum that distorted history glorifying Arab invaders and identifying Pakistan with the invaders. In 1973/74 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced a new constitution that reaffirmed Pakistan as an Islamic republic; reserved President and PM positions to Muslims, reinforced teaching Islamiyat in schools, set up an initiative to ensure every law was in harmony with the faith; paid government salaries to imams of mosques; moved weekends to Fridays; banned night clubs, gambling and liquor; triggered movement to Sharia and declared Ahmadiyas as non-Muslims although none of this eventually won him popular support. In 1977-85 General Zia completed Islamisation process. He passed Hudood laws; imposed Zakat and made blasphemy a crime punishable with death. Finally a new constitution was adopted in 1985 that enshrined supremacy for Islam in the governance of Pakistan.

Pakistan went on to become a frontline warrior state for Islam. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto held the first Islamic summit in 1974 setting up the Organization of Islamic States; started a nuclear program that had tacit funding and support from Arab states; nurtured and funded Burhanuddin Rabani’s mujahideen in Afghanistan as early as 1972. Zia funded/supported jihadi warriors against Soviet rule in Afghanistan and Indian rule in Kashmir. Musharraf's "running with the hare and hunting with the hound" policy turned the jihadists against Pakistan.

The erosion of political framework was also gradual: In 1953 Governor General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed an elected government; installed a puppet government; and dismissed the puppet government too. An obliging Chief Justice Munir upheld Ghulam’s actions by inventing the dubious “doctrine of necessity” that would eventually destroy Pakistan’s democracy. In 1956 President Iskander Mirza (an erstwhile General) weakened civil government by dismissing elected governments four times in 30 months with power shifting slowly and firmly to the army. In 1958 General Ayub Khan set up the first military rule. In 1974 Bhutto turned to army to maintain law and order. General Zia-ul-Haq declined to help; set up the second military rule and moved Bhutto to prison/death. In 1999 Pervez Musharraf removed Nawaz Sharif and set up the third military coup and dictatorship. Pakistan alternated between military dictatorships and corrupt civil governments.

End result: Pakistan became a military dictatorship financed by US (and Saudi Arabia) administering a theology based law, pursuing terrorism as a state policy, in possession of a nuclear device, and an infrastructure that creates a large pool of terrorists with designs to take over the State.

Akbar thinks Pakistan will not disintegrate. However, the odds seem to favour Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

“பாடாத பாட்டெல்லாம்” by Kannadasan

One song that I keep humming often is this melody written by Kannadasan; composed by Viswanathan & Ramamurthy and sung by P B Srinivas and Janaki in the 1962 movie Veera Thirumagan.

Reason: Soothing emotions expressed in awesome lyrics. Kannadasan’s imagination, choice of words and ability to express emotions are awesome.

The plot is simple: He tells us of the progress of his love for her through various phases: Attraction, Expectation, Hesitation, Consummation and yearning for the union of souls not just body.

Here goes my understanding of what I consider to be one of the best songs ever written in Tamil:

பாடாத பாட்டெல்லாம் பாட வந்தாள்
காணாத கண்களைக் காண வந்தாள்

She came to sing tunes that she never sang before; implying that this is a first for her. She came to see eyes that have never seen before; implying she expects this to be my puppy love too.

பேசாத மொழியெல்லாம் பேச வந்தாள்
பெண் பாவை நெஞ்சிலே ஆடி நின்றாள்

Yet she came to say stuff she never said before; implying an intention to cross the rubicon! I am hooked!

மேலாடை தென்றலில் ஆ ஆ ஆ
பூவாடை வந்ததே ம் ம் ம்

Her upper garment. Gentle breeze. Wow!
And, I was close enough to smell her fragrance. Ahem!

கையோடு வளையலும் கல் கல் கல்
கண்ணோடு பேசவா சொல் சொல் சொல்

Physical proximity is nice but I yearn for proximity of minds where spoken word is not necessary; where one can communicate with eyes.

அச்சமா நாணமா இன்னும் வேண்டுமா
அஞ்சினால் நெஞ்சிலே காதல் தோன்றுமா 

I sense hesitation still. Is this due to fear (and therefore I need to go slow) or shyness (and therefore I need to hasten)? Can we ever make an omelette without cracking an egg? Will she open up?

மிச்சமா மீதமா இந்த நாடகம்
மென்மையே பெண்மையே வா வா வா

Is the residual hesitation a useless remainder (like food left in the plate) or useful remainder (like food left in the buffet)? Should I take a step back or a step forward? I don’t know. I would just make an appeal.

இரவிலே நிலவிலே சேதி வந்ததா
உறவிலே உறவிலே ஆசை வந்ததா

Oh yes. What made her move forward? Did the ambience trigger passion?

மறைவிலே மறைவிலே ஆடலாகுமா
அருகிலே அருகிலே வந்து பேசம்மா

Now that the physical union is consummated, I yearn for union of mind and soul. Come my friend, let us chat.

P B Srinivas, in his best years then, does full justice to Kannadaasan’s lyrics. S Janaki’s humming demonstrates how a composer adds to lyrics without writing a word.

In my younger days, there was no TV. We had to do with radios. We had the luxury of hearing a song and doing our own visualization. Nowadays when this song is telecast, I close my eyes (to not let the poor quality visual affect the excellent image I carry in my mind from childhood) and enjoy.

There is a far older poem in Tamil that goes:
செவ்விது செவ்விது பெண்மை ஆ
செவ்விது செவ்விது காதல்
A critic in that century said that the word that packed maximum meaning in the entire poem was the fourth one!

All I can say about Kannadasan's song is: "ஆ! ஆ! ஆ!"